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END OF THE CHASE: USING NORTH CAROLINA AS
A GUIDE FOR ENDING OTHER STATES' VIDEO
SWEEPSTAKES LEGISLATIVE MERRY-GO-ROUND




The proliferation of game machines that offer illegal gambling' in
unconventional and non-casino locations began in the early twentieth
century.2 The prohibition of slot machines forced the evolution of the
gaming industry into video-gambling machines with manufacturers
creating additions and modifications to slot machines thus making
new games which conform with state laws. Commentators and judges
have stated that no industry in the history of man has gone to such
great lengths as the gambling industry to comply with the letter of the
law while defying its spirit and purpose.'
While illegal slot machines became rare in the mid-1970's, the first
generation of legal video games became popular.' Video arcade
games and pinball machines created a new industry of skill-based
games played primarily for entertainment.' In short time, gambling
operators developed attachments to games in the form of meters and
knock-off switches to allow the games to keep track of house payouts
in exchange for free plays, transitioning the games from mere en-
tertainment to de facto gambling devices.7 It was not long after the
* Attorney, W. Hill Evans, PA, Marion, NC; B.A., University of South Carolina, 2010;
J.D., University of Mississippi School of Law, 2013. The author would like to send a special
thank you to his friends and family for their patience and assistance with this article, without
whom none of this would have been possible. He can be reached by email at
wrs.whillevanspa@gmail.com.
1. The distinction between the terms "gaming" and "gambling" is debatable, with "gam-
ing" sometimes referring to legal gambling or games that do not involve a wager. For purposes of
this article, the terms "gaming" and "gambling" will be used interchangeably.
2. Ronald J. Rychlak, Video Gambling Devices, 37 UCLA L. REv. 555, 558-59 (1990).
3. Id. at 560.
4. See e.g., id. at 560 n.23, quoting City of Moberly v. Deskin, 169 Mo. App. 672, 678, 155
S.W. 842, 844 (1913).
5. Rychlak, supra note 2, at 566.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 563-65. The meters kept track of how many free replays the owner of the estab-
lishment housing the game knocked-out, the amount of which was subtracted from the net pro-
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first Atari gaming system in 1972 that gambling operators applied the
same technology from entertainment games to resemble traditional
Vegas-style gambling games, complete with knock-off switches and
meters to facilitate illegal gambling payouts.8 Video gambling boomed
in the late twentieth century as state law struggled to keep up with
advances in technology, and the proliferation of video-gambling ma-
chines consumed numerous states including North Carolina, South
Carolina, Florida, Texas, Virginia, Massachusetts and Ohio 9 among
others. As lawmakers attempted to regulate video gambling, the in-
dustry evolved into today's generation of quasi-legal video- gambling
machines: video sweepstakes.'o
The North Carolina General Assembly fought the proliferation of
video gambling devices for nearly fifteen years." Beginning with at-
tempts to control and eventually outlaw video-gambling devices,
members of the video-gambling industry constantly adapted their op-
erations to circumvent each law the legislature passed, most recently
with the advent of video sweepstakes.' 2 The back-and-forth battle
culminated with the Supreme Court of North Carolina holding North
Carolina's latest video-sweepstakes law not unconstitutionally vague,
despite pleas from the video gambling community that the law was too
broad and a violation of their First Amendment right to free expres-
sion." While the video gambling community vowed to alter their
games and continue offering their services in conformity with the
ceeds and reimbursed to the establishment owner before he or she and game operators split the
remainder. The effective result was the same as a direct payout to the player from the game, with
the devices keeping accurate accounting of how many knock-outs the establishment owner paid.
Because of the decentralized nature of the payouts, these sort of gray area games long escaped
prosecution as gambling devices. For a more detailed explanation of the technical mechanics of
early gaming machines, see id. at 565 n. 48-49.
8. Id. at 566. The Vegas-style games removed any skill associated with pinball or video
games, and shifted the appeal from entertainment value derived from the game itself to en-
tertainment derived from the possibility of a payout.
9. Nick Montano, N.C. Supreme Court Outlaws Sweepstakes Video Gaming; Dec. 14 Rul-
ing Says Games Are Not Protected By Free Speech, VENDING TIMEs Vol. 53 No. 1 (Jan. 2013);
available at http://www.vendingtimes.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?nm=Vending+Features&type=Pub-
lishing&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle&tier=4&id=D6C3466E8BDB401BB45DAA308CC
D160F; see also Darren Barbee, Critics Call Video Sweepstakes a Bad Bet, STAR TELEGRAM
(Dec. 18, 2011), http://www.star-telegram.com/2011/12/18/3602599/critics-call-video-sweepstakes.
html.
10. Caroline Denning & Douglas L. Yearwood, Internet Sweepstakes Cafes: A Survey of
Law Enforcement Perceptions, NORTH CARoINA CRIMINAL JusTicE ANALYSIS CENTER Gov-
ERNOR'S CRIME COMMISSION (Oct. 2010), at 1, available at https://www.ncdps.gov/div/gcc/pdfs/
internet-cafe.pdf.
11. Richard Ducker, Zoning and Video Sweepstakes Operations, UNC-Chapel Hill School
of Government (Sept. 2012), http://www.sog.unc.edu/node/2632.
12. Id.
13. Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, 366 N.C. 289, 290, _ S.E.2d- (2012).
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VIDEO SWEEPSTAKES
court's decision,1 4 it seems that the North Carolina General Assembly
finally struck a balance between effectiveness in stopping video gam-
bling and generality in making sure that the law was broad enough to
limit loopholes and circumvention from the video-gambling industry.
Even if the legislative remedy turns out to be temporary, it seems that
other states suffering from the inability to control video gambling de-
vices and their latest iteration video sweepstakes may be able to look
to North Carolina as a model for how to effectively end the legislative
chase to control video gambling.
This article will begin with a discussion of gambling generally and
legislative attempts at prohibiting video gambling. This discussion is
followed by a brief history of video gambling and its evolution into
video sweepstakes operations. The article will then turn to the legisla-
tive history of North Carolina concerning video gambling and video
sweepstakes, as well as the recent Supreme Court of North Carolina
case Hest Technologies, Inc. v. North Carolina, which clarified the
constitutionality of recent North Carolina video sweepstakes legisla-
tion. Next, the article will analyze the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina's decision and attempt to prescribe a set of suggestions for other
state legislatures to effectively curtail video gambling, using the North
Carolina law as a guide. Finally, the article will lay out potential
problems for the future of the law in North Carolina that other states
should be cognizant of when drafting upcoming legislation.
II. GAMBLING
The history of gambling and games of chance dates back to the days
of the ancient Egyptian, Greek, and Roman empires." England used
lotteries to finance American colonization and later colonists used lot-
teries to finance American rebellion against British rule.'" The
proliferation and regulation of gambling in the United States came in
waves, first from colonization to the early nineteenth century to fun-
draise the emerging country, then later in the South to help raise
funds to rebuild after the Civil War. 7 States began regulating gam-
bling activity in the late nineteenth century and a second wave of the
proliferation of gambling came in order to recover from the Great
Depression in the 1930s.11 A third wave came in the 1960s when legis-
14. Mark Blinker, Court Upholds Law Banning Video Sweepstakes Gambling, WRAL.com
(December 14, 2012), http://www.wral.com/court-upholds-law-on-video-sweepstakes-gambling/
11877821.
15. Mike Roberts, The National Gambling Debate: Two Defining Issues, 18 Wfii-rrflER L.
REV. 579, 582 (1997).
16. Id. at 582-83.
17. Id. at 583-84.
18. Id. at 584-85.
2013]1 43
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latures began allowing state-sponsored lotteries as a successful state
revenue source.' 9 In each wave, state lawmakers quarreled with pri-
vate gambling operators to prevent the rise of organized crime and
negative social stigmas associated with casinos and gambling.20 One
constant remained throughout history; no matter the steps taken by
legislators to curb gambling activities, private gambling operators al-
ways found ways to evolve their businesses to legal conformity and
profitability.
Gambling is defined generally as having three elements: considera-
tion, chance, and reward.21 North Carolina General Statute
(N.C.G.S.) § 14-292 similarly defines gambling as "any person or or-
ganization that operates any game of chance or any person who plays
at or bets on any game of chance at which any money, property or
other thing of value is bet, whether the same be in stake or not." 2 2
Gambling operators took steps over time to eliminate one or more of
the elements from their games in order to avoid legislative restric-
tion.23 For example, video- sweepstakes companies purportedly re-
moved the consideration element from video-poker machines, thus
keeping the environment and market of video-poker gambling while
sidestepping its legal restrictions.24
III. VIDEO SWEEPSTAKES
Video-sweepstakes machines evolved as a semi-legal response to
video poker prohibition. 25 The machines typically worked by allowing
users to buy a product such as prepaid phone cards or internet time,
which in turn provided the user a free entry or entries into a sweep-
stakes.26 The sweepstakes provided the purchaser a magnetic stripe
card that allowed the user to access a virtual game station terminal, at
which the user can play video games that reveal whether they won or
lost.2 7 Customers had the choice of whether to instantly reveal all of
their sweepstakes results at once when logging on to the terminal or
instead to play games mimicking traditional gambling games one at a
time to reveal the sweepstakes results and enjoy the entertainment of
19. Id. at 586.
20. Id. at 588.
21. Hest Techs., Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Perdue, 366 N.C. 289, 290 n.1, _S.E.2d_
(2012).
22. N.C. GEN. SrAr. § 14-292 (2012).
23. Hest, 366 N.C. at 291, - S.E.2d at
24. Id.
25. Ducker, supra note 11.
26. Blinker, supra note 14
27. Hest, 366 N.C. at 292-93, _S.E.2d at
4
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those games.2 8 Patrons discovered whether they won or lost the
sweepstakes through use of the purchased phone or internet time,
often displayed by games similar to traditional gambling games such
as poker and slot machines, or other video games.2 9 Unlike live poker
and slot machine gambling, the games used to reveal sweepstakes re-
sults were merely simulations of traditional gambling games, because
they had a predetermined finite pool of entries and winners. 3 0 Opera-
tors fixed the sweepstakes outcome and the game did nothing to de-
termine or modify the sweepstakes result.3 1 Software developers
designed the video sweepstakes to have similar payouts as lotteries
and other traditional gambling games; enough winners to retain cus-
tomers, but not so many as to significantly cut into the game opera-
tor's profits.32 Some games allowed the players to wager their
sweepstakes entries for prizes with the greater wager receiving greater
cash winnings.33 The sweepstakes contestants could redeem their
prize, if any, for more sweepstakes entries, or could cash out. 34
In 2012, insiders estimated video-sweepstakes industry gross reve-
nues around $1 billion in North Carolina alone. 5 Spectrum Gaming
Group's, a New Jersey-based gaming research service, cited law en-
forcement regulation, elimination of internet sweepstakes and caf6s as
number seven on its list of the twenty-one most important trends that
the global casino industry needed to monitor in 2013.36 Indeed, video-
sweepstakes gaming was widespread and substantial. Sweepstakes op-
erators contended that they were innocently in the market of selling
prepaid telephone and internet service, and the sweepstakes were a
legitimate tool to market those services rather than gambling.37 How-
ever, the similarity between video sweepstakes machines and tradi-
28. Felix Gillette, The Casino Next Door, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK MAGAZINE (Apr.
21, 2011), available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_18/b4226076180073.
htm.
29. Blinker, supra note 14.
30. See Hest, 366 N.C. at 293, _ S.E.2d at
31. Id. at 293, - S.E.2d at _
32. Barbee, supra note 9. For example, one machine's chance of winning $1,000 is 2 in
250,000. The odds of winning $500 are 3 in 250,000. While the odds of winning are displayed on
each machine's screen, there is typically no way for the public to ascertain the odds or verify
whether the winning prize has been claimed already.
33. Gillette, supra note28.
34. Hest,. 366 N.C. at 293, _ S.E.2d at
35. Binker, supra notel4.
36. Spectrum Gaming Group Identifies Top 21 Casino Industry Trends for 2013,
MARKETWIRE (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/spectrum-gaming-
group-identifies-top-21-casino-industry-trends-for-2013-1735758.htm.
37. Hest. 366 N.C. at 292, S.E.2d at
2013] 45
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tional gambling was described as "thinly-veiled," 3 8 s]"pretextual," 3 9 "a
mere subterfuge," 40 and "the functional equivalent of gambling." 41
The popularity of video sweepstakes spawned a secondary industry
of internet caf6s, essentially hubs of desktop computers, allowing pa-
trons to play sweepstakes games and redeem prepaid internet cards to
check sweepstakes results at a single location. 42 In addition to sweep-
stakes and gaming use, the internet caf6 computers also offered gen-
eral internet access.4 3 Despite internet caf6 insistence not to use terms
associated with illegal gambling,4 4 many resembled casinos by utilizing
playing cards as wall decorations and desktop computer terminals that
looked like traditional slot machines. 45 Establishments used primarily
for gaming in North Carolina, such as internet caf6s, generally do not
qualify for a state permit to sell alcoholic beverages on the premises.4 6
However, locations that use video sweepstakes machines as an acces-
sory rather than their main source of business, such as a bar or restau-
rant that contains a machine, may serve alcohol to sweepstakes
contestants legally. 47 Companies formed to assemble video sweep-
stakes caf6s and set up the businesses, and acted as an intermediary
between the caf6s and sweepstakes software companies. 48 The compa-
nies advised the new caf6 owners, sold new video sweepstakes ma-
chines and installed the machines. 49 Additionally, the companies
assisted the new caf6 owners and employees with "compliance train-
ing" designed to inform those involved with the business of its possi-
ble legal ramifications.so
It was initially questionable whether video sweepstakes machines
met the traditional definition of gambling." Specifically, operators
separated the payment of the games by requiring users to purchase
phone and internet time that allowed them to access results of their
free sweepstakes entries, rather than purchasing the sweepstakes en-
38. Gillette, supra note 28.
39. Hest, 366 N.C. at 292, - S.E.2d at .
40. Id. at 294; quoting United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 330, 339-40 (5th Cir. 2012).
41. Hest, 366 N.C. at 294, _ .E.2d at
42. Gillette, supra note28.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Ducker, supra note 11.
47. Id.; citing Carandola v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507 (2002). "Note [N.C.]G.S. 18B-1005(a)(6),
part of North Carolina's alcohol control law, was enacted to prevent illegal and disorderly con-
duct that may arise where alcohol is served to the public requires permit holders to take steps in
connection with adult live entertainment to prevent, among other things, prostitution, gambling,
fights, and nudity." at 514-15.
48. Services, SWEEPSCOACH, available at http://www.sweepstakesmachines.com/services.
49. Gillette, supra note 28.
50. Id.
51. Binker, supra note 14 at 2.
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tries directly, thus making the consideration element more remote.52
Video sweepstakes operators contended, despite the traditional gam-
bling appearance of the sweepstakes machines and internet caf6s and
even the possibility that users believed they were gambling, 3 that the
format of the games was a legal sweepstakes rather than illegal gam-
bling.5 4 While the games gave off the illusion of gambling to custom-
ers, operators contended that the predetermined and finite pool of
prizes, as well as offering methods of free entry, rendered the games
sweepstakes and did not constitute illegal gambling operations.55
Some have long considered video gambling to be a "victimless
crime." 56 There is evidence that internet caf6 users saw video sweep-
stakes as a relatively harmless form of gambling." To the contrary, a
survey issued by the Florida Council on Compulsive Gambling found
after increased calls regarding internet caf6s and pathological gam-
bling that the average income of those experiencing problems from
sweepstakes use was $26,000, with the average reported gambling
losses exceeding $34,000. In North Carolina, nine out of ten calls to
the state's Council on Problem Gambling were video sweepstakes re-
lated.5 1 It seems that the placement of video- gambling machines in
commonly accessible locations such as gas stations and internet caf6s
created a new class of problematic gamblers, particularly, in those ar-
eas where casinos were previously harder to reach. Additionally, by
putting video sweepstakes terminals in low-income area strip malls,
52. Id.
53. Gillette, supra note 28, at 10. Some customers are quoted with reference to internet
caf6s as saying, "It's gambling... I don't care what they call it." and ""[The nomenclature]'s a
joke . It's gambling."
54. Id. at 7.; see also Barbee, supra note 9. The video sweepstakes operators often compared
their business model to the popular legal Monopoly promotion sweepstakes at McDonald's fast
food restaurants. The promotion requires McDonalds' customers to purchase an item from the
fast food chain, which in turn gives the purchaser a free entry into a predetermined sweepstakes.
Customers can win free items as well as cash prizes from a finite and limited prize pool, as
opposed to gambling which would have some element of chance. Video sweepstakes operators
contended that their customers are merely buying internet time, as McDonalds' customers buy a
Big Mac, both of which were accompanied by free entries into the sweepstakes. A video sweep-
stakes company president even went as far as to say that state governments have a legitimate
state interest in regulating McDonalds' sweepstakes because they use the Monopoly game to
promote fast food and soft drink sales to children in the midst of a nation-wide obesity epidemic.
55. See Gillette, supra note -28.
56. Rychlak, supra note 2, at 572-73. .
57. Gillette, supra note28, at 2. One Central Florida user said of the caf6s, "You can come
here and get your mind off everything. You're not going to win the mortgage. You're not going
to lose the mortgage. It's pretty harmless."
58. Fla. Council on Compulsive Gambling, Inc., Internet Sweepstakes Centers (June 30,
2010), http://www.ordinancewatch.com/files/LocalGovernment/LocalGovernment54229.pdf
59. Barbee, supra note 9, at 2. Gary Gray, the Council's executive director, stated "For the
most part, these sweepstakes places, they're kind of like crack cocaine."
2013] 47
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outsiders were prone to view the games as a vice that has negative
social impacts.
IV. NORTH CAROLINA VIDEO GAMBLING LAW
A. Legislative History
North Carolina attempted to regulate lotteries and other forms of
gambling through the courts and state legislature for over a century. 60
The North Carolina General Assembly clashed with gambling opera-
tors to legislate changes in the gambling industry, first with video-
poker gambling and most recently with video sweepstakes." Article
37 of the N.C.G.S. provides relevant state law concerning lotteries,
gaming, bingo, raffles and sweepstakes.62 North Carolina was once
home to numerous video poker machines.63 In 2000, the North Caro-
lina General Assembly passed legislation designed to limit video
poker machines to those already in use, and put a moratorium on the
installation of any new machines. 64 Even after the end to video poker
growth due to the 2000 law, 10,000 legal video poker machines re-
mained in play throughout the state, along with an estimated addi-
tional 20,000 illegal machines. 65 The proliferation of illegal video
poker machines after the 2000 change, as well as enforcement
problems differentiating between legal and illegal machines, led to a
complete prohibition on video gambling in 2006.66 The North Carolina
General Assembly extended the prohibition on video gambling to the
internet in 2008 by applying the ban to server-based gaming opera-
tions making it "unlawful for any person to possess any game terminal
with a display that simulates a game ordinarily played on a slot ma-
chine. . .or a video gaming machine. . .for the purpose of promoting,
operating, or conducting a server-based electronic game promo-
tion."67 The effective result of the video gambling bans was an indus-
try change from video poker machines to seemingly legal video
sweepstakes. 8 By removing the consideration element from the
60. Reed J. Hollander, An Entertaining Display of Thin and False Apparel: The Dividing
Line Between Conduct and Protected Speech in Hest v. State, Tiwu CONSTrrUTIONAISr Vol. 18,
No.2 4 (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.nelsonmullins.com/DocumentDepot/HollanderNC
BarConstitutionalist2013.pdf; citing State v. Perry, 154 N.C. 616, 70 S.E. 387 (1911).
61. Hest, 366 N.C. at 290-91, _ S.E.2d at
62. N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-289 to 14-309(2005)
63. Mike Baker, Video Poker a Job Jackpot for N.C., Consultant Says, S'rARz Nuws (May 18,
2006, 8:25 AM), http://www.starnewsonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060518/NEWS/
605180349/-1/State.
64. N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-306.1A; see also Ducker, supra note 11.
65. Baker, supra note64.
66. Ducker, supra note 11 at 1.
67. N.C. GE1N. STAr. § 14-306.3 (2012); see also Ducker, supra note 11.
68. Ducker, supra note 11.
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games and offering them as sweepstakes, operators contended that
the new games fell out of gambling legislation's scope. In essence,
this created a cat-and-mouse game between state legislators and
video-gambling operators to adjust their gaming model to legally con-
form to the changing language of anti-gambling laws aimed at ending
those gaming activities.70
A sweepstakes is defined in North Carolina as "any game, advertis-
ing scheme or plan, or other promotion, which, with or without pay-
ment of any consideration, a person may enter to win or become
eligible to receive any prize, the determination of which is based upon
chance." 7 ' North Carolina began its attempt to prohibit video sweep-
stakes with N.C.G.S. § 14-306.1A(b)(9), outlawing "any.. .video game
not dependent on skill or dexterity that is played while revealing a
prize as the result of an entry into a sweepstakes." 72 When the North
Carolina General Assembly passed the law banning the simulation of
poker and slot machines in sweepstakes systems, the sweepstakes in-
dustry in response began offering slightly more creative video games
to reveal sweepstakes results, seemingly putting the machines outside
the scope of the law banning poker and slot machine simulation." To
counter video sweepstakes operators new methods of circumvention,
the North Carolina General Assembly passed N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4 in
2010 to broaden the law's reach by prohibiting the use of an elec-
tronic machine or device to conduct or promote a sweepstakes
through the use of an entertaining display.74 The law not only prohib-
ited conducting or promoting a sweepstakes through an entertaining
display but also included a catch-all provision designed to end the cat-
and-mouse game of regulating video gambling stating, "it is the intent
of this section to prohibit any mechanism that seeks to avoid applica-
tion of this section through the use of any subterfuge or pretense
whatsoever."7 ' The all-encompassing language of the statute identi-
fied the legislature's aim to not only end video sweepstakes operations
in their current form but also any potential future conversions to
video sweepstakes made with the primary objective of circumventing
anti-gambling laws.
Political contributions from video poker and sweepstakes operators
added another dimension in the legislation restricting video gambling.
69. Hest Techs., Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Perdue, 366 N.C. 289, 290, _ .E.2d _,
70. Austin Baird & Lynn Bonner, N.C. Supreme Court Overturns an Earlier Ruling by the
State Appeals Court, NEws & OBSERVE7R (December 17, 2012), available at http://www.newsob-
server.com/2012/12/17/2544689/nc-supreme-court-upholds-ban-on.htmi.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-306.4(a)(5) (2012).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-306.1A(b)(9) (2012).
73. Hest, at 366 N.C. 289, 290, _ S.E.2d at
74. N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-306.4(a)(3) (2012); see also Ducker, supra note 11.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-306.4(c) (2012).
2013]1 49
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Investigation of these contributions gained significant media attention
as the legislature attempted to change gaming laws in North Carolina.
Commentators often credited Former House Speaker, Jim Black, with
preventing changes to gambling laws once they reached the North
Carolina House of Representatives, contrary to his acceptance of sig-
nificant political funds from the video-gaming industry.7 6 Addition-
ally, in 2013, several North Carolina lawmakers, including Governor
Pat McCrory, donated funds from their 2012 campaign contributions
to charity in 2013 after a considerable campaign donor, who was also a
video sweepstakes operator was arrested in Florida for racketeering
and money laundering in connection with his video-sweepstakes busi-
ness." The contentious and political nature of gambling laws often led
to heightened scrutiny from opposing parties, and in turn, negative
publicity for those who accepted campaign contributions from the
sizeable video gaming and sweepstakes lobbies.
B. Hest Technologies, Inc. v. State of North Carolina
1. Background
Hest Technologies, Inc., was a developer and marketer of electronic
sweepstakes hardware and software located in Dallas-Fort Worth,
Texas. International Internet Technologies LLC, of Oklahoma, and
Sandhill Amusements, Inc. of Pinehurst, North Carolina, joined Hest
as plaintiffs. 7 9 All of the companies ran video sweepstakes operations
in North Carolina.s0 As slot machine operators practiced decades
before,8 the plaintiffs requested an injunction, granted in 2008, that
prevented law enforcement from seizing equipment and otherwise
taking adverse action against the video sweepstakes operators.82 The
North Carolina General Assembly amended North Carolina gaming
restrictions, which resulted in the modification of the injunction, fur-
ther permitting video sweepstakes operators to continue profiting
from the machines for years while the matter was litigated. 3 The in-
76. Baker, supra note64. Rep. Black eventually was forced to resign and spend three years
in federal prison after pleading guilty to one felony count of accepting illegal gratuities related to
his connections in the lottery and video poker industries; see also Former House Speaker Black
to Resign, Plead Guilty, WRAL.com (Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://www.wral.com/news/
state/story/1202817.
77. John Frank & Craig Jarvis, McCrory, Lawmakers Donate Campaign Money Received
from Sweepstakes Owner Caught in Gambling Probe, CIJARLOTIE OBSERVER (Mar. 14, 2013),
available at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2013/03/14/3915342/mccrory-lawmakers-donate-
campaign.htmi.
78. Barbee, supra note 9.
79. Montano, supra note 9.
80. See Id.
81. Rychlak, supra note 2, at 561-62.
82. Hest Techs., Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Perdue, 366 N.C. 289, 291, _ S.E.2d at-,
83. Id..
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junction stood until the trial court determined that November 2010,
N.C.G.S. §14-306.4 was constitutionally sound, save for its catch-all
provision which the Court declared overbroad.' On appeal, the plain-
tiffs argued that the entire N.C.G.S. §14-306.4, forbidding the use of
an electronic machine to conduct or promote a sweepstakes through
the use of an "entertaining display," was an infringement of their First
Amendment free speech rights because it regulated the games' result
displays rather than the games themselves.ss
2. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina
A divided Court of Appeals panel declared that the 2011 law, which
banned electronic machines that conduct sweepstakes through the use
of an entertaining display, provided a virtually unlimited definition. 6
The Court noted that N.C.G.S. §14-306.4 forbade only the sweep-
stakes using a video game to display its results." Had the plaintiffs'
sweepstakes used a different method of revealing the outcome, the
North Carolina law would permit it as a legal sweepstakes.88 There-
fore, the same machine the plaintiffs used could conceivably legally
operate a sweepstakes so long as the sweepstakes displayed its result
with words instead of an entertaining game display.89 As such, the
Court concluded that the law regulated the speech of the video game
result rather than the conduct of operating the sweepstakes."o Addi-
tionally, the Court looked at the plaintiffs' overbreadth argument,
claiming that the statute placed no limitations on the definition of an
entertaining display and therefore potentially banned all video games
which communicated a sweepstakes result." The appellate court af-
firmed and held that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and
infringed upon the plaintiffs' speech protected by the First Amend-
ment.92 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina not only affirmed
the trial court determination that the catch-all provision was over-
broad, but also reversed the trial court holding with regard to the rest
of §14-306.4, declaring the entire statute unconstitutional.9 3 However,
the opinion contained a written dissent by Judge Robert C. Hunter on
84. Id. at 293
85. Hest, - N.C. App. , 725 S.E.2d 10, 12 (2012). .
86. Id. at, Hest, N.C. App. -, 725 S.E.2d 10, 13 (2012).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 13. . "[I]f the sweepstakes conducted by plaintiffs were exactly the same in all
respects, except that the results were conveyed by means of a scratch off ticket, a motion picture,




91. Id. at _ N.C. App. -, 725 S.E.2d 10,14.
92. Id. at 14-15.
93. Id. at 15. .
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which the State based its appeal to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina.94
Judge Robert C. Hunter's dissent concluded that N.C.G.S. §14-
306.4 regulated conduct, rather than speech, and was therefore en-
tirely constitutional." The dissent pointed to a nearly identical case in
Florida,9 6 which held that state law did not restrict the sweepstakes'
owners' speech but rather the conduct of operating a sweepstakes, an
activity unprotected by the First Amendment.9 7 Because the statute
regulated conduct rather than speech, it only needed to show a ra-
tional basis to be constitutional, which the law expressly contained in
its aim to protect the morals of North Carolinians." The State's re-
striction of entertaining displays to reveal sweepstakes results was
therefore rationally related to the government's power to promote the
welfare of society. 99 Additionally, Judge Hunter concluded that the
statute was not overbroad because it only prohibited video games in
the context of sweepstakes results, and not video games or sweep-
stakes generally.o The law did not unintentionally restrict any consti-
tutionally protected rights of other businesses, and was not
overbroad."o' Judge Hunter's conclusion that the statute was neither
overbroad nor an unconstitutional restriction on the plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights formed the foundation for the Supreme Court of
North Carolina's opinion. 02
3. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
The Supreme Court of North Carolina heard arguments appealing
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina decision on October 17,
2012.103 The Court opened its opinion with a near century old fore-
shadowing quote from State v. Lipkin, discussing gambling operators'
insistence on creating schemes of evasion "within the mischief, but not
quite within the letter of the definition" of a lottery.'04 The court in
Lipkin provided guidance to the Hest court stating, "Look to the sub-
stance and not to the form of [gambling], in order to disclose. . .the
94. Hest Techs., Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Perdue, - N.C. App. -, 725 S.E.2d 10
(2012) (Hunter, R., dissenting).
95. Id. at 15 (Hunter, R., dissenting).
96. Hest N.C. App. -, 725 S.E.2d 10, 15 (2012) (Hunter, R., dissenting) (citing Allied
Veterans of the World, Inc. v. Seminole County, Fla., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (M.D. Fla. 2011)).
97. Id. at 16.
98. Hest, 725 S.E.2d at 17-18
99. Id. at 18-19
100. Id. at 19-20
101. Id. at 21
102. Id. at 22
103. Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Purdue, 366 N.C. 289, 289 (2012).
104. Id. at 289-90, _S.E.2d at
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pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent."1 0 5 Essen-
tially, the Lipkin court examined whether the gray area gambling ac-
tivity the law sought to prohibit enticed its users with an unreasonable
sense of hope that they will win a great deal for very little cost. 0 6 The
lure, rather than the game itself, was the activity the law intended to
prohibit according to Lipkin.07
The Hest court acknowledged that state legislatures have the police
power to regulate gambling and reached different levels of regulation
in history through weighing the social costs of gambling against its
economic benefits.'o The North Carolina General Assembly origi-
nally exercised its power to regulate gambling by placing a complete
prohibition on lotteries and casino gaming, and has since evolved to
allow a state-sponsored education lottery and one Native American
casino.' Relying largely on the intent of N.C.G.S. §14-306.4, the
Court looked to the substance of video- sweepstakes games rather
than the name and form of the games the law made illegal.' 0 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina provided that although the video-
sweepstakes games did not constitute gambling, the legislature viewed
them in the same light because they presented the same moral harms
as traditional gambling."11 The Court noted that by adding the lan-
guage of N.C.G.S. §14-306.4, it was a specific attempt by the legisla-
ture to prevent sweepstakes operators from "exploit[ing] a loophole in
the state's gambling laws."1 12 Indeed, the Court noted, the continuing
clash between legislators and video sweepstakes operators was strik-
ingly similar to the battle that occurred when the legislature at-
tempted to outlaw lotteries and slot machines in prior decades.'13
Despite the strong similarity between video sweepstakes and illegal
gambling, the Court refused to hold that the machines were summa-
rily a pretext to circumvent anti-gambling statutes.1 4 Because the op-
erators offered free sweepstakes entries, removing the bet or





110. Id. at 290-91, _S.E.2d at; The court drew comparison to Lipkin to look past how
"skillfully disguised" the games were to determine if they had the requisite chance element to
constitute gambling, including whether the player is lured to the game and enticed by a false
hope of chance at great winnings. That "deceptive scheme.. is what the law denounces as wrong
and demoralizing." Id.
111. Id. at 294, _S.E.2d at; Id. ("In effect, the General Assembly determined that plain-
tiffs' business models, involving sales of Internet time and telephone cards with accompanying
"free" sweepstakes entries, are a mere pretext for the conduct of a de facto gambling scheme.")
112. Id. at 290, _S.E.2d at; see also Blinker, supra note 15
113. Id. at 292, _S.E.2d
114. Id. at 295, _S.E.2d_
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consideration element from the games, the video sweepstakes ma-
chines technically fell outside the traditional definition of gambling.'1 5
However, the Court did not determine whether the video sweepstakes
were illegal gaming because it was within the legislature's purview to
regulate business practices which are prone to moral corruption." 6
The Court was able to rule on the constitutionality of the statute
whether it was considered gambling or not." 7
The Court also looked to the few other jurisdictions that previously
addressed the legality of video sweepstakes machines. 8 In every
case, the appellate courts upheld the prohibiting statute because the
courts viewed the video sweepstakes as "gambling in disguise.""'
However the Court again refused to rule entirely on the precedential
cases because it relied largely on factual evidence that the sweep-
stakes' internet cards went mostly unused, which was a pretext to the
covert gambling operation.12 0 Hest had no such factual evidence, and
the Court refused to assume the internet time was going unused to
summarily dismiss the case as "an illegal gambling operation that
use[d] the sale of legal products as a pretext to avoid state gambling
laws."12'
The Court finally found its reasoning by looking to the First
Amendment issue of N.C.G.S. §14-306.4 and whether regulation of
the games' display rather than the games themselves was an infringe-
ment of Hest's rights to free speech and expression. 22 Hest argued
that the games were entertainment and thus deserved full protection
under the First Amendment, and that the regulation of the display of
the sweepstakes' results was an unconstitutional restriction of free ex-
pression. 23 The State argued that the law only prohibited the conduct
of operating a machine that carries out sweepstakes using an enter-
taining display.124 The Court agreed with the State's argument and
determined that operating the video sweepstakes machines, as well as
running a sweepstakes, was non-communicative conduct subject to
regulation rather than protected speech.125 The Court reasoned that
115. Id. at 294, _S.E.2d
116. Id. at 296, _S.E.2d at
117. Id.; Id. ("It is well settled that the police power of the state may be exerted to preserve
and protect the public morals. It may regulate or prohibit any practice or business the tendency
of which, as shown by experience, is to weaken or corrupt the morals of those who follow it or to
encourage idleness instead of habits of industry.")
118: Id at 297, _S.E.2d at_
119. Id. at 294, _S.E.2d at_
120. Id. at 295, _S.E.2d at
121. Id.
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N.C.G.S. §14-306.4 regulated the conduct of operating a sweepstakes
and the communication of the sweepstakes' result, not the video game
itself which would be protected entertainment.12 6 The Court deter-
mined that the mere communication of the sweepstakes' result and
use of words did not automatically implicate the First Amendment's
speech protection but was simply a necessary part of the conduct of
the greater sweepstakes.127 While not all conduct can be labeled
"speech" simply because the conduct expresses an idea, conduct may
still constitute communication sufficient to fall within the scope of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.128 The plaintiffs did not allow cus-
tomers to play the video games for reasons other than to reveal
sweepstakes results, further signaling that the games were a mere dis-
guise for the sweepstakes themselves.12 9 The statute did not prohibit
video games, which were protected under the First Amendment, but
rather the conduct of sweepstakes operation that coincidentally
utilizes a video game to display its result.13 0 Subsequently, the Court
analyzed the First Amendment claim under the scrutiny of conduct
that incidentally burdens speech, since a regulation may still infringe
free speech rights if it legitimately restricts conduct.'
A law may regulate conduct that incidentally burdens speech if (1)
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; (2) it furthers
a substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.132 The Court determined
in Hest that (1) the State has long held the "power to address the
health, safety and welfare concerns presented by gambling opera-
tions. . .even if they cleverly avoid the traditional definition of gam-
bling;" (2) the State's interest in combating vices associated with video
126. Id.; Id.( (holding a law banning the sale of violent video games to be an unconstitutional
restriction of protected speech under the First Amendment). See also Allied Veterans, 783 F.
Supp. 2d 1197 (2011) (The court quotes a case in Florida dealing with a similar statute designed
to limit video sweepstakes operations, stating Hest is "free to provide the video games to their
patrons and their patrons are free to play them. . .so long as the games are not associated with
the conduct of a payoff").
127. Id.; Id. (The court points out that the substance of the speech was not at issue in this
case- that the announcement of results could state whether the patron won or lost, or the amount
of money won, and the law would apply equally to the different forms of speech); Id. at 300,
S.E.2d at (What limited speech is involved with the announcement of a sweepstakes result is
no more protected than calling bingo numbers or "21" in a game of blackjack).
128. Id. at 298, _S.E.2d at_; Id. (The court noted that it may be possible to find some
expression in every activity a person undertakes, and therefore refused to apply First Amend-
ment protection to any conduct simply labeled as "speech").
129. Id. at 300
130. Id. at 13.
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sweepstakes machines was a substantial interest; (3) the statute aims
to control the operation of video sweepstakes machines and therefore
is unrelated to any resultant suppression of free expression associated
with the sweepstakes result announcement; and (4) the restriction on
First Amendment freedoms as a result of the law is no greater than
necessary to prevent the specific activity identified by the statute.133
Thus, the Court held the State's interest in regulating "repeated, ad-
dictive, gambling-like play through. . .video display" outweighed any
resultant restriction on Hest's speech.134
Additionally, the Court also dismissed the plaintiffs' overbreadth
argument because any consequential restriction on conduct protected
by the First Amendment was specifically targeted by the law.135 There
was no factual showing that the law burdened any speech other than
that which it intended: video sweepstakes machines.13 6 Though the
Court admitted to the rather broad language of the statute and its
catch-all provision, it refused to declare the statute summarily over-
broad without any factual showing that some conduct or speech other
than the target video sweepstakes machines was unintentionally ham-
pered by the law.
The Court also struck down the plaintiffs' contention that the law
could not selectively ban video sweepstakes involving an entertaining
display without banning all sweepstakes.' 3 8 The legislature was within
its purview to adopt a law that addressed a specific type of sweep-
stakes aimed at circumventing state gambling laws, and was under no
obligation to outright prohibit all sweepstakes to control only a cer-
tain type.139 Consequently, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina decision and declared N.C.G.S. §14-306.4 constitu-
tional, making video sweepstakes machines in their present form
illegal.'40
133. Hest, supra note 11, at 19-21.
134. Id. at 20-21.
135. Id. at 21. "Where Conduct and not merely speech is involved ... the overbreadth of a
statue must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep," quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2918
(1973).
136. Hest Techs., Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Perdue, - N.C. App. -, 725 S.E.2d 10, 21
(2012)
137. Id.
138. Id. at 22.
139. Id. "[Tihere is no constitutional requirement that a regulation, in other respects permis-
sible, must reach every class to which it might be applied- that the Legislature must be held
rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none." quoting Adams v. N.C. Dep't of Natural & Econ.
Res., 295 N.C. 683, 693, 249 S.E.2d 402, 408 (1978).
140. Id. at 23.
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After the Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision, video
sweepstakes operators contended that their business was no different
from traditional sweepstakes games, and they vowed to continue to
shape their operations to conform to the changing laws. 1 4 1 In a matter
of weeks, video sweepstakes programmers created a pre-reveal con-
version to the old sweepstakes machines which did not use an enter-
taining display, possibly rendering the games legal and back within the
bounds of N.C.G.S. §14-306.4.142
In the wake of Hest, at least one named plaintiff, International In-
ternet Technologies LLC, decided to stop doing business in North
Carolina, citing that "conditions of release and other court orders
make it virtually impossible for [International Internet Technologies]
to provide day-to-day support for their licensees in [North Caro-
lina]."I 43 While the decision did not necessarily mean that the internet
caf6s associated with the company would close, as they could license
software from other providers, a spokesman for the North Carolina
Sheriff's Association described one of the largest video sweepstakes
software company's decision to leave the state to be "huge."14 4 The
company maintained that its conduct was legal, and instead decided to
direct "its full attention and resources" to its ongoing legal battles in
Florida. 1 45 The North Carolina law's success in Hest was expected to
spawn greater video sweepstakes regulation in other states. 1 46
V. ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATION
Legislators face the same problem with video sweepstakes prohibi-
tion that they faced when attempting to ban video poker and other
gray-area machines decades before: how to draft effective legislation
to stop video sweepstakes without infringing on non-gambling video
game machines and legitimate sweepstakes. The key to drafting an
effective anti-video gambling statute is to be neither over nor under
inclusive. Therefore, lawmakers face an array of challenges in drafting
video gambling regulations that are balanced and not subject to genu-
ine dispute from video sweepstakes operators.
The overarching law and policy question often associated with gam-
bling is whether regulation is even possible with seeming industry in-
141. Blinker, supra note 14.
142. Hollander, supra note6l.




146. Montano, supra note 9.
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sistence on skirting the law as legislators draft it. At the very least,
video gaming and sweepstakes operators are able to profit from their
products in the interim as legislatures draft laws to conform with
mechanical and technological advances. In addition, such operators
utilize injunctions against seizure and prosecution while the law is
clarified. Therefore, it is imperative that new legislation aimed at re-
stricting video gambling be general enough to prevent video gambling
industry circumvention of the law. Legislatures must strike a delicate
balance to make new laws specific enough to not be unconstitutionally
vague, yet broad enough to encompass offshoot designs and video
gambling machine additions aimed at evading the letter of the law.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina hinted in Hest that video
sweepstakes machines did not constitute illegal gambling in its tradi-
tional definition.'4 7 The Court instead relied on the negative social
effects of video sweepstakes separate from gambling, and the legisla-
ture's ability to regulate the conduct leading to those social evils. If
the Court determined that video-sweepstakes machines constituted il-
legal gambling, as the Fifth Circuit did in United States v. Davis, the
discussion of statutory breadth and operator First Amendment rights
would be unnecessary. Despite offering free sweepstakes entries to
avoid the consideration element of traditional gambling, the vast
amount of video sweepstakes entries often come from paid entrants.
Additionally, facts in other cases showed that customers rarely used
the phone and internet cards for anything other than entering video
sweepstakes. While courts generally give sweepstakes ultimate protec-
tion from prosecution as illegal gambling operations as long as they
allow free entries to the sweepstakes,'4 8 an exception for sweepstakes
with nearly zero percent free entries may be plausible. In such circum-
stances, a court could determine that the limited free entries consti-
tute a general belief that consideration is necessary to enter the
sweepstakes and consider video sweepstakes gambling. The significant
problem that arises with such a sweeping test is that most people do
not take advantage of the "no purchase necessary" method of enter-
ing legitimate sweepstakes and the test may pull many legitimate
sweepstakes operations under the umbrella of its authority. Though
inconsistent with precedent, by declaring video sweepstakes to have
de facto consideration despite their "no purchase necessary" method
of entry, states could regulate video sweepstakes operations as illegal
gambling.
147. Hest Techs., Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Perdue, _N.C. App. _, 725 S.E.2d 10, 11
(2012) "[O]ne can question whether these systems meet the traditional definition of gambling-
because plaintiffs have ostensibly separated the consideration or "bet" element from the game of
chance feature by offering "free" sweepstakes entries."
148. Glick v. MTV Networks, 796 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Instead of simply declaring video sweepstakes to have de facto con-
sideration, state legislatures should amend the current gambling ele-
ments test of consideration, chance and reward. Rather than an
elements test, courts could utilize the same three elements of gam-
bling in a more flexible factors test. By switching from an elemental
standard to a factors test, states could hold video sweepstakes opera-
tors liable despite the operators ridding themselves of a single gam-
bling element. In the case of video sweepstakes, the mere ridding of
consideration by allowing free sweepstakes entries could be out-
weighed by a showing of substantial chance, through random prede-
termined sweepstakes results, and reward, through considerable
disproportionate payouts. As a result, a court would still likely con-
sider the video sweepstakes operations in Hest to be gambling under
this test due to the overwhelming resemblance to traditional gaming
despite lacking in consideration.
In order to avoid potential First Amendment claims from video
sweepstakes operators, it is also imperative that any new law expressly
state its purpose. In Hest, the legislature strengthened N.C.G.S. §14-
306.4 by including the law's aim to "prohibit any mechanism that
seeks to avoid application of this section through the use of any sub-
terfuge or pretense whatsoever." 4 9 Additionally, the purpose of the
law must further a legitimate governmental interest, allowing the state
to overcome any incidental restriction the law places on video-sweep-
stakes operators' conduct. The Hest court explained that the state had
the "power to address the health, safety and welfare concerns
presented by gambling operations. . .even if they cleverly avoid the
traditional definition of gambling."1 s0 It may be beneficial for legisla-
tors to include similar language in its video sweepstakes regulation
statute that sets out the specific legislative interest and powers of the
legislature to restrict video sweepstakes conduct. Lawmakers must be
mindful to draft laws specifically targeted at controlling the conduct of
operating a video sweepstakes rather than any speech or expression
related to the sweepstakes that may receive greater First Amendment
protection.
Another recommendation to state legislatures in drafting video
gambling regulations is to define the illegal activity the law seeks to
control rather than detailing the physical mechanism, as suggested in
Lipkin. For example, by leaving ambiguous the exact method of out-
put for a video gambling machine-whether it is by coin, credit, prize,
or other payout-and instead focusing on the payout itself, there is
149. N.C.G.S. §14-306.4(c).
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less room for video gambling machine operators to make technical
changes to their machines that only act to circumvent the letter of the
law. Video poker machine regulation displayed such circumvention in
the early history of gambling legislation, where lawmakers outlawed
machines utilizing poker or slot machine displays, and video gambling
operators simply began using non-casino games to continue gambling
operations in conformity with the new laws. Legislators should word
laws to regulate the entertaining conduct or entitlement of winnings
rather than the method by which the game delivers the winnings. To
do this, lawmakers are encouraged not to simply add provisions which
disallow only a current problem, but to amend existing anti-gambling
laws that will be mindful of general developments in video gambling
technology. Along the same lines, anti-video gambling legislation may
also include an intent element, of which legislators take emphasis off
the operator's conduct and shift it instead to the intent of the operator
and effect of the machine. If a video sweepstakes operator intends to
closely tie his or her business to resemble a gambling operation, it
could be criminalized as such. By creating less conduct-based laws, it
will be more difficult for operators to work around the letter of the
law because it regulates the result and effects of their actions rather
than the specific acts themselves. Instead of focusing legislation on
defining gambling devices, lawmakers should turn their attention to-
ward regulating the vice and negative social outcomes of the devices.
In addition, in order to outlaw the conduct of operating video gam-
bling rather than specific games, the legislature should focus on the
vices and enticements that gambling and gray area video gaming have
in common. By controlling the negative social effects of video sweep-
stakes, operators will be less able to simply adapt their machines to
conform to recent legislation. Essentially, instead of making a certain
gray-area gambling machine illegal, the law should prohibit all activi-
ties which result in social vices similar to gambling. If video gaming
operators are able to modify their machines avoiding the negative so-
cial evils commonly associated with gambling, the games would likely
no longer need regulation. By focusing the law on the actual problem,
= the resulting social harms rather than the specific machines, legisla-
tors can more effectively control the areas of gray area gambling
where there is a substantial governmental interest.
Next, to increase the effectiveness of anti video sweepstakes law,
legislatures should develop a substantial similarity test. The test would
assist in determining if the regulated conduct, on its face, appears sub-
stantially similar to the sort of illegal gambling the statute aimed to
prohibit. Such a test would be comparable to the analysis of the court
in Hest, allowing the court to avoid questions of whether or not con-
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duct fell within the legal definition of gambling, to determine whether
its business practices and social consequences were substantially simi-
lar to those associated with gambling. While effectively using the same
analysis as whether the video sweepstakes operation included de facto
consideration, a court would not need to determine whether an activ-
ity was gambling in order for a legislature to regulate it. If a type of
conduct substantially resembled gambling, it would be punishable in
the same manner as traditional gambling. Courts would no longer
need to determine whether or not an activity falls within the tradi-
tional definition of gambling, but simply whether it substantially re-
sembles gambling.
Another alternative to controlling video gambling, and perhaps
gray area gambling altogether, is the criminalization of any operation
attempting to circumvent gambling laws. It would seem, under the
facts of Hest and other video sweepstakes machine operations, that
there was sufficient evidence to determine that video- sweepstakes op-
erations evolved largely in response to attempts to outlaw the activity.
By criminalizing this sort of loophole-seeking, states could add yet an-
other deterrent to engaging in quasi-gambling activity and penalize
those who toe the line of illegal gambling the same way they penalize
traditional illegal gambling operations.
An added possible solution is to place a cap on sweepstakes win-
nings. Though the games would still exist, the primary social evils as-
sociated with gambling such as compulsive behavior and extreme
financial loss would be limited, if not eliminated. States could also cap
winnings by placing a maximum level on the games' returns versus
value ratio. In that sense, a prize could not be worth more than a
certain amount times the amount paid to enter the sweepstakes, or the
value of the good associated with the sweepstakes. A maximum on
winnings and losses each play forces the video sweepstakes business to
dealing only in de minimis transactions, reducing the likelihood of
negative social effects of gambling while permitting non-gambling
video gaming. Such a solution may also effectively end the video
sweepstakes industry by reducing the games to their limited entertain-
ment value, taking the enticement of riches out of the games and leav-
ing little reason to play them since they do not involve skill.
Alternatively, regulations could control the type of prizes awarded
through sweepstakes, such as restricting sweepstakes winnings only to
products offered by the sweepstakes operator. In the case of internet
cafds, the law would allow video sweepstakes, but only with a possibil-
ity of winning more prepaid internet time. Admittedly, such a solution
could possibly impede on the marketability of legitimate sweepstakes.
2013] 61
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Lastly, changing to a more general standard of proof is potentially
appropriate to control illegal gambling. As the gambling industry con-
tinues its practice of complying with the letter of the law while evad-
ing its spirit and purpose, as the court stated in Moberly v. Deskin,'
lawmakers may deem it necessary to create laws that lack specifically
defined parameters. Justice Potter Stewart made what is now possibly
the most memorable standard in the history of the Supreme Court, in
reference to obscene material that "I know it when I see it."152 Like
obscenity, gambling often suffers from a similar inability to define the
kinds of activities that constitute gambling. With that in mind,
lawmakers are advised to create a similar general standard to apply to
video gambling regulations. Rather than attempting in vain to specify
what activities fall within the definition of gambling, all the while
chasing technological evolutions in the video gambling industry,
lawmakers should instead trust courts to "know gambling when they
see it." Like a substantial similarity test, courts would determine that
any activity which promotes the same negative effects of gambling,
whether it is gambling by definition or not, would still be punishable
as gambling. Though an inexact and potentially problematic standard,
by reducing the objectivity of the legal test for gambling, lawmakers
may finally be able to curb the sort of activities that mirror illegal
gambling despite their technical compliance with the law.
VI. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
Lawmakers must anticipate members of the video gaming industry
attempting to continue their business through exploiting possible
loopholes in the language of new legislation as they have with past
laws. Hest displayed the obvious problem in drafting legislation to
control video gaming machines in both making the law constitution-
ally specific and not impeding on First Amendment rights of free
speech and expression.' 53 Though North Carolina was successful de-
fending its law against Hest Technologies, other jurisdictions may find
differently. State Legislatures' heavy reliance on potentially unpre-
dictable court interpretations of the law presents uncertainty that
lawmakers would likely rather avoid.
One substantial problem facing lawmakers is avoiding inclusion of
otherwise legal business practices under the umbrella of legislation de-
signed to prohibit illegal video gambling. Video-sweepstakes machines
were difficult to regulate because of their similarity to traditional legal
sweepstakes, a similarity that the industry utilized as a defense in
151. City of Moberly v. Deskin, 169 Mo. App. 672, 678, 155 S.W. 842, 844 (1913).
152. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Potter, J., concurring).
153. Hest, 366 N.C. at 293, _ S.E.2d at .
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Hest.15 4 Indeed, it can be assumed that gray area gambling operators
will continue to base their business models on legitimate activities to
serve as a shield from legislative action. By imposing restrictions on
winnings or payout limits, lawmakers run the risk of encroaching on
non-gambling sweepstakes campaigns. A cap on winnings would likely
jeopardize the commonly cited McDonald's sweepstakes' $1 million
grand prize. Likewise, restricting prizes to products and services of-
fered by the sweepstakes operator would endanger all of McDonald's
non-instant win prizes. To create laws that effectively restrict video
gambling disguised as sweepstakes while not infringing on legitimate
sweepstakes from other businesses is a difficult exercise in terminol-
ogy, magnified by the video gambling industry model of intentionally
mirroring legitimate sweepstakes.
Future problems with video gambling regulation may also include
the practicality of enforcement. In any scenario where the law allows
some form of legal gaming to continue, whether only for entertain-
ment value or by creating a de minimis exception, it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to enforce laws against video gambling machines as they
are harder to differentiate from legal video gaming. Enforcement will
often fall on local law enforcement agencies, adding increased bur-
dens on police and sheriff's departments. To compound the matter,
the strategic location of video sweepstakes machines in low-income
areas, often accompanied by high crime, makes for even greater diffi-
culty enforcing new legislation because law enforcement is predis-
posed. Additionally, some localities may fall within the group who
believe video sweepstakes to be a harmless and victimless crime and
may even substantially benefit from video sweepstakes revenues at
the local government level. For these reasons, merely passing legisla-
tion may be insufficient to fully halt problematic video sweepstakes.
Many of the previously mentioned suggestions involve a significant
amount of deference to the courts to interpret each case's facts to de-
termine if the questionable activity is substantially similar to gambling
on its face. Though most of the courts ultimately upheld the laws ban-
ning such sweepstakes, or declared the sweepstakes to be illegal gam-
bling operations, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina's decision in
Hest should serve as a caution for the possibility that a court may rule
in favor of sweepstakes operators. District courts in South Carolina
are also split on the issue of video sweepstakes legality.15 5 Lawmakers
will find themselves in a quandary that the more general a law is writ-
ten in order to include the greatest number of gray area gambling op-
154. Barbee, supra note 9.
155. Barbee, supra note 9.
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erations; the more deference there will be for courts to interpret the
law.
The last problem affecting video sweepstakes regulation, and any
gambling ban, comes from the pro-gambling community. It is undenia-
ble, aside from the perceived social evils and vices associated with
gambling, that the industry can present tremendous potential benefits
as well. Governments used lotteries as a legitimate fundraising source
throughout the history of the United States.15 6 Proponents of video
sweepstakes were quick to point out the potential loss of state reve-
nues and employment for North Carolina in the wake of the Hest de-
cision. 157 States and localities not only benefit from taxing video
sweepstakes businesses but also may charge licensing and operating
fees per machine.15  Less gambling-conservative states may have a
harder time convincing their voting constituents that the negative so-
cial impacts of gambling outweigh the potentially substantial eco-
nomic benefits. For example, despite Florida courts finding video
sweepstakes operators to be engaged in illegal gambling, the State's
residents continue to demand more gambling activities.159 Increased
demand for convenient gambling options in Florida not only gives
greater incentive to video sweepstakes operators to find ways around
anti-gambling laws in the state but also puts pressure on Florida legis-
lators to tread carefully with voters on laws that will potentially re-
strict their constituents' access to convenient gambling alternatives.
States with similar political makeup may be prone to the same
challenges.
VII. CONCLUSION
Regulating video gambling is a problematic necessity for many
states. With the growth of the video gambling industry, the amount of
money wagered on video gambling machines continues to increase
and there is consequentially an increase in the social evils that sur-
round gambling. The unique nature and location of most video gam-
bling machines and its special impact on low-income communities
156. Roberts, supra note 15 at 586.
157. Enforcement of Ban On Video Sweepstakes Machines Varies Across N.C., WINsiON-
SALEM JOURNAL (Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.journalnow.com/news/locallarticle
f955ddc6-5609-11e2-94df-0019bb3Of3la.html. One video sweepstakes industry executive esti-
mated a possible loss of $1 billion and 100,000 jobs in North Carolina alone.
158. Mark Wineka, Banned or Not, Video Sweepstakes Mean Money to City, SAlIIS3URY
Posr (Feb. 15, 2013), available at http://www.salisburypost.com/article/20130215/SP01/130219737.
For example, the city of Lumberton, N.C., charged video sweepstakes operators a $5,000 license
fee to house video sweepstakes machines, and an additional $2,500 fee per machine.
159. Lawrence G. Walters, Esq., Sweepstakes & Sunshine: A Review of Florida's Game Pro-
motion Statute, GAMBLING LAW UPDATE (Jan. 2011), at 7-8, available at http://www.gamblinglaw
update.com/archives/SweepstakesArticle%20-%2OFinal.pdf.
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furthers the need to regulate the industry. Due to the insistence of
video gambling operators on modeling their businesses after legiti-
mate games and sweepstakes and designing their games to bring gray
area gambling operations in conformity with the law, legislators face
an uphill battle to regulate video gambling.
As lawmakers tangle with how to regulate the video sweepstakes
industry and internet caf6s effectively, it is prudent that they look to
North Carolina as a successful example. While other jurisdictions may
disagree with the Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision in Hest,
state legislatures can best create sustainable and effective new laws by
striking the balance between wide-reaching application and constitu-
tional specificity. States suffering from an inability to control video
gambling proliferation can use North Carolina as a model for how to
end the legislative chase to curtail video gambling.
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